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LIST OF PARTIES 
1. The Estate of Louis J. Uzelac. Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr. is 
the successor personal representative of the Estate and, 
since the Estate is insolvent and cannot afford counsel to 
defend Barbara's appeal, has chosen not to participate in 
these proceedings. 
2. Barbara B. Uzelac, second wife and surviving spouse of 
Louis J. Uzelac. Barbara is the Plaintiff below and 
Appellant herein. 
3. Allyson D. Uzelac and S. Brooke Mageras, daughters of Louis 
J. Uzelac and Ruth Uzelac. Allyson and Brooke are 
Intervenors below and Cross-Appellants here. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Under Louis7 Will, what are the proper 
classifications of the parties' devises? Were Louis' daughters 
general devisees or residuary beneficiaries? Was the devise to 
Barbara a general devise chargeable to specific property or a 
"general pecuniary devise?" 
Standard of Review: The determination of these categories 
of devises is a mixed question of fact and law. "A mixed 
question involves 'the application of law to fact or, stated 
more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts 
comes within the reach of a given rule of law.'" Jensen v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1(57, 82 P. 3d 1076. If a case involves 
a mixed question of fact and law, the appellate court affords 
some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of 
law to a given fact situation. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
937-38 (Utah 1994); see also Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1244 (Utah 1998) . "The measure of discretion afforded varies, 
however, according to the issue being reviewed." State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1(25, 63 P.3d 650. 
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Preservation of Issue in Court Below: On remand, the trial 
court considered the proper classification of devises. Barbara 
briefed the issue at R.1631 and the trial court ruled at R.1754, 
p. 5, para. 14 and fn.l. 
Issue #2: Did the trial court calculate the proper amount 
of money "acquired by the parties during the marriage and held 
at death?" 
Standard of Review: A district court's findings of fact 
are reviewed for clear error. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, 123 
P.3d 416. 
Preservation of Issue in Court Below: This issue was 
briefed on remand at R.1585-1587 and the trial court ruled at 
1751-1754. 
Issue #3: Does the status of the homestead (deeded to 
Brooke and Allyson subject to Barbara's life estate) affect 
Barbara's claims for relief? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the legal 
characteristics of a life estate is a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of 
the trial court. Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 
56, 42 P.3d 1253. 
Preservation of Issue in Court Below: On remand, Barbara 
argued the trial court should at once order the homestead 
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returned and sold and that she was entitled to retain her life 
estate interest. R.1638. The trial court denied the relief at 
R.1755 and 1757. 
Issue #4: Was Barbara's request on remand for the trial 
court to order Brooke and Allyson to return the homestead 
property to the Estate time barred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-412 
and 75-3-1004 and 1006? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of statutes presents a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. In re VKS, 2003 UT 
App 13, 63 P.3d 1284. 
Preservation of Issue in Court Below: The statute of 
limitations argument was raised on remand at R.1583-1584 and the 
trial court ruled at R.1754-1755. 
Issue #5: What was the testator's overall purpose? 
Standard of Review: A district court's findings of fact 
are reviewed for clear error. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, 123 
P.3d 416. 
Preservation of Issue in Court Below: This issue was 
preserved for appeal at R.1585. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201 General Definitions. 
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of 
a decedent from his personal representative other than as a 
creditor or purchaser. 
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(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a 
judge with notice to interested persons. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412. Formal testacy proceedings -- Effect 
of order -- Vacation. 
(1) Subject to appeal and subject to vacation as provided 
in this section and in Section 75-3-413, a formal testacy order 
under this part, including an order that the decedent left no 
valid will and determining heirs, is final as to all persons 
with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that 
the court considered or might have considered incident to its 
rendition relevant to the question of whether the decedent left 
a valid will, and to the determination of heirs, except that: 
(a) The court shall entertain a petition for modification 
or vacation of its order and probate of another will of the 
decedent if it is shown that the proponents of the later-offered 
will were unaware of its existence at the time of the earlier 
proceeding or were unaware of the earlier proceeding and were 
given no notice of it, except by publication. 
(b) If intestacy of all or part of the estate has been 
ordered, the determination of heirs of the decedent may be 
reconsidered if it is shown that one or more persons were 
omitted from the determination and it is also shown that the 
persons were unaware of their relationship to the decedent, were 
unaware of his death, or were given no notice of any proceeding 
concerning his estate, except by publication. 
(c) The order originally rendered in the testacy proceeding 
may be modified or vacated, if appropriate under the 
circumstances, by the order of probate of the later-offered will 
or the order redetermining heirs. 
(d) The finding of the fact of death is conclusive as to 
the alleged decedent only if notice of the hearing on the 
petition in the formal testacy proceeding was sent by registered 
or certified mail addressed to the alleged decedent at his last 
known address and the court finds that a search under Subsection 
75-3-403(2) was made. 
(2) If the alleged decedent is not dead, even if notice was 
sent and search was made, he may recover estate assets in the 
hands of the personal representative. In addition to any 
remedies available to the alleged decedent by reason of any 
4 
fraud or intentional wrongdoing, the alleged decedent may 
recover any estate or its proceeds from distributees that is in 
their hands, or the value of distributions received by them, to 
the extent that any recovery from distributees is equitable in 
view of all of the circumstances. 
(3) A petition for vacation under either Subsections (1)(a) 
or (b) must be filed prior to the earlier of the following time 
limits: 
(a) If a personal representative has been appointed for the 
estate, the time of entry of any order approving final 
distribution of the estate, or, if the estate is closed by 
statement, six months after the filing of the closing statement. 
(b) Whether or not a personal representative has been 
appointed for the estate of the decedent, the time prescribed by 
Section 75-3-107 when it is no longer possible to initiate an 
original proceeding to probate a will of the decedent. 
(c) Twelve months after the entry of the order sought to be 
vacated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909. Improper distribution -- Liability of 
distributee. 
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned 
because of adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee 
of property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who 
was improperly paid, is liable to return the property improperly 
received and its income since distribution if he has the 
property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to 
return the value as of the date of disposition of the property 
improperly received and its income and gain received by him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1004. Liability of distributees to 
claimants. 
After assets of an estate have been distributed and subject to 
Section 75-3-1006, an undischarged claim not barred may be 
prosecuted in a proceeding against one or more distributees. No 
distributee shall be liable to claimants for amounts received as 
exempt property, homestead or family allowances, or for amounts 
in excess of the value of his distribution as of the time of 
distribution. As between distributees, each shall bear the cost 
of satisfaction of unbarred claims as if the claim had been 
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satisfied in the course of administration. Any distributee who 
shall have failed to notify other distributees of the demand 
made upon him by the claimant in sufficient time to permit them 
to join in any proceeding in which the claim was asserted 
against him loses his right of contribution against other 
distributees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006. Limitations on actions and 
proceedings against distributees. 
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy 
proceeding or in a proceeding settling the accounts of a 
personal representative or otherwise barred, the claim of any 
claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to pay the 
claim, and the right of any heir or devisee or of a successor 
personal representative acting in their behalf, to recover 
property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any 
distributee is barred at the later of: 
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year 
after the decedent's death; and 
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at 
the later of: 
(i) three years after the decedent's death; or 
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof. 
(2) This section does not bar an action to recover property 
or value received as the result of fraud. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The decedent, Louis J. Uzelac lived at 5559 and 5561 
Highland Drive for over 40 years. Together with his wife, Ruth, 
he raised his two daughters, Brooke and Allyson, on that 
property (hereinafter "the homestead"). T.135-130 The 
homestead originally consisted of three contiguous parcels of 
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land. R.139 The original house still exists on the second 
parcel. In the early 1960s, a new dwelling house was completed 
across two of the parcels. T. 135-136; R.140 The third parcel 
has always been vacant and undeveloped. R.14 0, R.500 Ruth died 
in 1974. R.420 
After the death of his wife Ruth, Louis married Barbara 
Bowden in 1976. The two resided on the homestead property. 
Prior to their marriage Louis and Barbara entered into an Ante-
Nuptial Agreement. Ex.1 The Ante-Nuptial Agreement 
acknowledges that both Louis and Barbara had children and 
property from prior marriages they wanted to protect. Ex.1 The 
Ante-Nuptial Agreement provided that real property owned prior 
to the marriage "shall be the sole and separate property of him 
and her or their respective estates." Ex.4 p. 2 The Ante-
Nuptial Agreement agreed, in the event of Louis' death, to pay 
Barbara moving costs "back to her own property; that in addition 
thereto, she shall have, in the event of the death of Louis, the 
right to reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her 
lifetime, or such shorter time as she may elect . . . " Id. Two 
years after the marriage, Louis made a holographic Will. Ex.4 
The Will stated: 
I direct that after all just debts, funeral expenses 
and expenses of administration are paid, I give, 
devise and bequeath as follows to my children Susan 
Brooke Uzelac Mageras and Allyson Drew Uzelac, all of 
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my property, real mixed or personal, share and share 
alike, they by mutual agreement to make distribution 
to themselves or others as they see fit. To my wife 
Barbara Uzelac if she survive me and we be lawfully 
wed at the time of my death, she is to receive per 
terms of our antenuptial agreement dated March 25, 
1976, except for item 2 page 2 is to be covered by 
joint bank account which I opened at First Security 
Bank of Utah in both of our names and deposited money 
as shown this account to belong to her. To my 
granddaughters Angela Marie Mageras and Amanda Mageras 
I give two thousand dollars1 each, this money to be 
deposited in bank accounts which I opened in each of 
their names at Tracy Collins Bank and Trust located on 
Holladay Blvd, Holladay, Utah. 
Id. Louis lived with Barbara until 1999 when he passed 
away. R.220 During the marriage Louis paid maintenance 
costs, taxes, insurance and utilities on the homestead. 
T.51, 80 Barbara paid for food and incidental household 
items. T.50, 80 Otherwise, Barbara kept her money and 
property separate. T. 49, 50, 79-81 
Barbara continued to reside at the homestead after 
Louis' death, and resides there now. R.650 
Courses of Proceedings 
After Louis died and his Will was entered into probate, 
Barbara at first refused to pay for taxes and insurance on the 
homestead. R.34 After almost two years, the Estate applied for 
Court assistance to order Barbara to reimburse the Estate for 
"payment of maintenance, real property taxes and insurance" on 
1
 By way of Codicil, this was later increased to $'.5,000. Ex.4 
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the homestead. R.3 0 The Court issued a Minute Entry which 
stated that the Ante-Nuptial Agreement "create [s] a life estate 
in Barbara Bowden Uzelac. The owner of a life estate is 
responsible for the maintenance of the property and payment of 
all taxes." R.13 6 The Court later signed an Order clarifying 
that Barbara had a "life estate determinable" in the two parcels 
of real property on which the dwelling house was located but no 
life estate in the third parcel. R.140 Barbara was ordered to 
reimburse the Estate for taxes, costs and insurance and to pay 
those expenses until the termination of her life estate. R.140 
Two months later, Barbara sued the Estate, alleging various 
causes of action and claims. R.156 All were rejected by the 
trial court and, at one point, Barbara was sanctioned. R.82 8 
Barbara has also sued the personal representative's Estate. 
See R.1544 
Barbara appealed the trial court's judgment after trial. 
R.1366 This Court issued the opinion of In re Uzelac, 2005 UT 
App 234, 114 P.3d 1164. The opinion upheld the trial court on 
certain issues but reversed and remanded on one issue. The 
opinion defined the contract term "acquired by the parties" and 
remanded to the trial court for consideration of that issue. 
At the conclusion of the appeal, counsel for the personal 
representative resigned. R.1464 Attorneys fees spent 
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litigating with Barbara exceeded $200,000. See R.1586 There 
was no more money left in the Estate to fund litigation2. 
Disposition in Court Below 
On remand, Barbara again asked the trial court to order 
Brooke and Allyson to reconvey the homestead into the Estate. 
R.1493 As a result, and in order to protect the finality of 
Judge Dever's 2003 ruling, Brooke and Allyson formally moved to 
appear in the case as Intervenors. R.1504 
After extensive briefing and a hearing, the trial court 
issued a written ruling finding that: 
• Brooke and Allyson are general devisees. R.1754 
• Barbara was entitled to Judgment against the Estate in 
the amount of $23 0,660. R.1757 This amount 
represented the amount of cash and stock Louis had at 
the time of his death ($305,463.33) minus the amount 
of cash held in his name at the time of his marriage 
to Barbara in 1976 ($52,012.43) minus adjusted 
distributions already received by Barbara ($22,790). 
R.1753-1754 
• Barbara does not have a claim to Louis' premarital 
property under the Ante-Nuptial Agreement. R.1750 
2
 Barbara asserts in her Brief that the 2003 transfer of the 
homestead to Brooke and Allyson (subject to Barbara's life 
estate) rendered the Estate insolvent. See Brief, p. 9. This 
is not true. The Estate was solvent until 2005. R.1464-1465 
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• Barbara's request to order Brooke and Allyson to 
reconvey the homestead property to the Estate was time 
barred. R.1754 
Barbara took this second appeal. R.1759 Brooke and Allyson, 
Intervenors, cross appealed. R.1768 
Statement of Facts 
The following facts, not already marshaled above, are also 
relevant to this appeal. 
1. Immediately prior to his death, Louis had $277,716 on 
deposit in various bank accounts. R.1005-1006 Of these 
funds, $201,839.15 was held in POD accounts. R.1006 
Therefore, $75,876.85 became part of the Estate and the 
$201,839.15 passed as a matter of law to the POD 
beneficiaries, including Barbara. 
2. When Louis married Barbara in 1976 he had $52,012.42 in 
various accounts. R.1004 
3. When Louis died, he also had the following property which 
was liquidated by the Estate: 
a. The third parcel of land adjacent to the homestead 
land. R.1004 This real estate was premarital 
property. R.1005 See Exs. 17, 18, 20 
b. Water shares for the homestead land. R.1005 These 
water shares were premarital property. Id. 
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c. Stock valued at 36,950.91. R.1007 The Estate was 
able to later sell3 certain of the stocks for 
$27,747.33. R.1752 The stock sold by the Estate 
was marital property. 
Immediately prior to and after Louis' death, Barbara 
received: 
a. Her life estate in the homestead. Ex.21 
b. $15,000 from an account Louis held jointly with his 
daughters; R.10 06 
c. $4,858.83 in Louis and Barbara's joint account. 
Ex.3 5 p.xii 
d. $12,790 in a POD account; R.1006 
e. $10,755 in personal property at the residence. 
Ex.36 
f. A vehicle. Ex.36 
g. Rents from the "original home" on th€> homestead 
property. Ex.3 7 p.xv 
Totaling paragraphs 4(b), (c) and (d) above, Barbara 
received $32,648.83 in cash after Louis' death. 
3
 In addition to an unfortunate market decline in the value of 
the stock, Barbara failed or refused to turn over certain of the 
certificates for three and a half (3%) years. R.1008 She also 
failed to turn over the water shares until there was a pending 
motion asking for a court order. R.874 and 901 The water 
shares, stock and real estate were sold at market value. 
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6. At all times, Barbara has retained her separate property, 
which is substantial. R.664 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In this unfortunate case Barbara Uzelac, now on her second 
appeal, asks the Court of Appeals to reach back four (4) years 
and into her deceased husband's premarital property to pay a 
devise she could have received in 1999. The trial court 
correctly refused to do this. 
The trial court erred, however, when it included the value 
of POD accounts in its calculation of property "held at death." 
ARGUMENT 
1. BROOKE AND ALLYSON ARE GENERAL DEVISEES. BARBARA HAS 
A GENERAL DEVISE CHARGABLE TO SPECIFIC PROPERTY. THE 
GRANDDAUGHTERS HAVE GENERAL PECUNIARY DEVISES. 
For the first five (5) years after Louis' death, Barbara 
attempted to jump ahead of Louis' other beneficiaries by 
claiming to be a claiming to be a "creditor" of the Estate4. The 
trial court and Court of Appeals rejected this argument. R.1475 
On remand, Barbara claimed to have a "general pecuniary devise" 
which would have entitled her to interest from approximately 
November 2000 to the present. R.1631 The Ante-Nuptial 
4
 Of course, creditors' claims are payable before distributions 
to devisees and are chargeable to general assets of the Estate, 
not to specific funds or property. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-801 et 
seq. 
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Agreement does not provide for the payment of interest to 
Barbara. 
The trial court property classified the devises. In 
classifying devises, a court should look at the testator's 
overall intent and purpose. See generally Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-102(2)(b). In this case, a specific finding was made 
that Barbara did not have a "general pecuniary devise." R.1754 
Indeed, the ultimate amount of Barbara's devise has been the 
subject of much dispute. See footnote 17 infra. The order on 
remand found that Brooke and Allyson were "general devisees." 
R.1754 The granddaughters had general pecuniary devises ($5000 
each)5. Ex.4 Unfortunately, Utah case law does not develop 
these categories. Both parties here rely upon the Restatement 
and statutory interpretation. 
A. A devise of a sum certain is a pecuniary devise, 
A pecuniary devise is ai devise of a specified amount of 
money. Restatement Third, Property § 5.1 Comment, 1999. 
Pecuniary means monetary6. Random House Webster's Unabridged 
Dictionary, 2nd Ed., 2001. Because it is paid on a sum certain, 
5
 This was not an express finding on remand. The trial court did 
not reach this issue since the Estate is insolvent and there is 
no money with which to pay the granddaughters. 
6
 Pe-cu-ni-ar-y: 1. of or pertaining to money. 2. consisting of 
or given or exacted in money or monetary payments., 
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the Code allows for interest to be paid "at the legal rate 
beginning one year after the first appointment of a personal 
representative until payment . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-904. Obviously, interest is not properly assessed on 
monetary devises if the amount cannot be ascertained until the 
net probate estate is determined and all claims are paid. 
The only pecuniary devises that appear in Louis' Will are 
the devises to Louis' granddaughters for $5,000 each. Ex.4 If 
the Estate had assets with which to make distributions, these 
would theoretically bear interest under Section 904. 
B. The devise to Barbara was a general devise chargeable 
to specific property. 
The Ante-Nuptial Agreement provided, upon termination of 
the marriage by death or otherwise, Barbara would be entitled to 
"all property, whether real, personal or mixed acquired by the 
parties." Ex.1 (emphasis added) The plain wording of the 
agreement demonstrates that this was not meant to be a 
"pecuniary devise" but a devise of marital property, in whatever 
form it may later be acquired. Barbara contracted her right to 
Louis' premarital property away in 1976. A recognition of a 
classification "general devises chargeable to specific property" 
appears in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-902, the abatement statute. 
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C. The devise of "all my property" is a general devise. 
The Restatement appropriately notes that ua devise of xall 
my property' is a general devise." Restatement Third, Property 
§ 5.1 Comment, 1999. As argued below, a reading of the Ante-
Nuptial Agreement and the Will clearly demonstrates that Louis 
intended to devise "all his premarital property" to his 
daughters and "all his marital property" to his wife. "The 
category into which a particular devise falls is a question of 
construction, on which the testator's overall purpose is 
relevant." Id. 
This Court should uphold the trial court's classification 
of these devises as consistent with Louis overall intent. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE INCLUDED THE VALUE OF 
LOUIS' POD ACCOUNTS IN THE JUDGMENT. THE TRIAL COURT 
FORGOT TO DEBIT BARBARA, FOR $4,858.83 ON DEPOSIT IN A JOINT 
ACCOUNT. 
On remand the trial court was directed to determine the 
amount "acquired by the parties during the marriage and held at 
death." R.1478 fn.2 It its order, the trial court figured this 
amount by taking the amount of cash/stock Louis had in accounts 
at the time of his death and subtracting the cash Louis had at 
the time of the marriage. There was no evidence introduced at 
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the trial by which to calculate the source of deposits7 during 
the marriage (be they from marital or premarital sources) and so 
the trial court chose to use this calculation8. 
However, the trial court was supposed to determine what was 
acquired by the parties and held at death. R.1478 fn.2 Herein 
the trial court clearly erred. Definitionally, POD accounts are 
outside the probate estate and are not "held at death." The 
trial court mistakenly included the value of the POD accounts in 
calculating its Judgment. Therefore, instead of using the 
initial figure of $305,463.33 as the total amount of money and 
after acquired stock "held at death" (R.1752) the trial court 
should have used $103,624.18 ($75,876.85 held in non-POD 
accounts at death (R.1005-1006) plus $27,747.33 (after-acquired 
stock R.1752)). Subtracting the amount of cash held in Louis' 
name at the time of his marriage to Barbara in 1976 ($52,012.43) 
minus adjusted distributions already received by Barbara 
($32,648. 83)9, the Judgment amount is properly $18,962.92. 
7
 Louis sold premarital property in Draper and Spring City but 
these proceeds were never accounted for. See R.32 Louis sold 
his premarital business and those proceeds were not accounted 
for or traced by either the Estate or Barbara. R.3 91 See also 
R.657 
8
 Barbara attempted to augment this amount by claiming amounts 
Louis spent on giving gifts to his daughters during his lifetime 
should be credited back to her. See e.g. R.1068 
9
 See Statement of Facts, paragraph 5, above. 
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It is well-settled that POD accounts are not "held at 
death." Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-205(1) (a) Mt]he decedent's 
ownership interest in property or accounts in POD registration 
with the right of survivorship" are included in the definition 
of "Property owned . . . by the decedent immediately before 
death that passed outside probate at the decedent's death. Id. 
(emphasis added) "Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a 
party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or 
parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is a 
clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the 
time the account is created." Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1) 
Under the plain terms of Utah law, the POD accounts were never 
assets of the probate estate, the personal representative never 
had jurisdiction over them and could not have been expected to 
distribute them to Barbara. 
3. THE HOMESTEAD IS ENCUMBERED BY BARBARA'S POSSESSORY 
INTEREST AND IS NOT CAPABLE OF BEING AN ASSET OF THE 
ESTATE. 
The Ante-Nuptial Agreement granted Barbara "the right to 
reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her lifetime, or 
such shorter time as she may elect . . . " Ex.4 In 2 001 the 
trial court held this was a "life estate determinable." R.138 
Indeed Barbara has been residing continuously at the homestead 
since Louis' death in 1999. R.650 
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Barbara's life estate is a possessory interest. THOMAS AND 
BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTY, 1999, § 2.02(d) (1) . It is terminable 
at Barbara's death or if she moves from the premises or 
remarries. Id. at § 2.02(d)(2). At no time from 1999-2007 
could the Estate have liquidated that property in order to pay 
claims. Since the homestead is clearly premarital property and 
Barbara's limited interest in the property had been 
adjudicated10, the Estate deeded the property to Brooke and 
Allyson in 2003. R.136; Ex.21 After the Court's ruling in 2001 
(R.138) the property could not possibly have been a general 
asset of the Estate since it was, and is, encumbered with 
Barbara's possessory interest. Barbara cannot sell the life 
estate because it cannot exist without her. 
Paradoxically and without supporting authority, the Estate 
asked on remand for the distributees to reconvey the property to 
the Estate, the Court to order the property sold and for it to 
order that Barbara be paid a "value" for her life estate. 
R.1633-1640 A hypothetical demonstrates the impossibility of 
Barbara's prayer for relief: suppose Louis had devised a life 
estate in the homestead to "Bob Jones." A district court could 
10
 Adjudication serves to protect the personal representative and 
the distributee alike. Adjudication also starts the clock on 
limitations and appeal rights for adverse parties and promotes 
the policies of finality and efficiency in the Code. 
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not, on one beneficiary's request, order the property sold to 
satisfy a devise (which was chargeable to other, specific 
property), eject Bob from his life estate and pay him a "value" 
for it. 
4. BARBARA'S ATTEMPT ON REMAND TO COMPEL BROOKE AND ALLYSON 
TO RECONVEY THE HOMESTEAD TO THE ESTATE WAS TIME-BARRED. 
Barbara argues, precariously, that her 2003 motion was a 
"proceeding" under the probate code and that she was never 
required to file a proceeding against Brooke and Allyson to 
preserve her right to reclaim the homestead after distribution. 
However, if the 2003 Motion was a proceeding, Judge Dever's 
denial of the same was final and appealable. As demonstrated 
below, Barbara is time barred either way. 
A, If, as Barbara claims, her "Petition" was a 
"proceeding" under the Probate Code, the time to 
vacate or appeal the Court's Order was long-expired. 
In 2001, the Estate applied to the trial court for 
assistance regarding the homestead property's maintenance. R.52 
The trial court made an order in which it ruled that Barbara had 
a life estate determinable in the homestead. R.136 Pursuant to 
that Order, the personal representative deeded the homestead to 
Brooke and Allyson in 2003 subject to Barbara's life estate 
determinable. Ex.21 
A few months later, Barbara filed a "Motion for an Order 
Directing Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the Estate, 
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or in the Alternative Voiding the Deed of Distribution." R.912 
Both the Estate and Brooke and Allyson opposed the motion. R.942 
and R.959 The trial court denied the request, rejecting 
Barbara's substantive arguments that the conveyance was a 
"conflicting interest transaction" and prematurely harmed her 
rights as a creditor of the Estate. R.1080 The Court's order 
is dated September 29, 2003. R.1080-1084; Addendum 4 
A "formal proceeding" is a "proceeding [] conducted before a 
judge with notice to interested persons." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-201(18). Barbara claims her 2003 motion is such a 
proceeding. See Brief at p. 13. The Utah Uniform Probate Code 
states the following relevant legal principals: "Each 
proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any 
other proceeding involving the same estate." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-106(1) (a). "[A]11 proceedings and actions to enforce a 
claim against the estate are governed by the procedure 
prescribed by [] Chapter 3" of Title 75. "Subject to appeal and 
subject to vacation . . . a formal testacy order . . . is final 
as to all persons with respect to all issues concerning the 
decedent's estate the court considered or might have considered 
incident to its rendition. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
412 (a) . 
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The Court's 2003 order in Barbara's "proceeding" was 
therefore "a final order" under Section 412(1) and immediately 
appealable. Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, "[ajppellate 
review . . . is governed by the rules applicable to the appeals 
to the Supreme Court in equity cases from the court of general 
jurisdiction. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-308. Those rules 
state that appeals may be taken from "all final orders11" within 
3 0 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from.12" Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) provides appellate 
jurisdiction "over . . . orders . . . of any court of record 
. . . over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction." Barbara did not file a timely appeal 
after the order was rendered in her proceeding in 2003. 
This view of statutory construction is supported by the 
case law. In In re Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, 655 
P.2d 646 (Utah 1982) Christensen's Will was admitted to probate. 
Christensen's wife then filed a petition alleging that she was 
an "omitted spouse" and for an order awarding her the proceeds 
of the sale of an automobile. The trial court denied the relief 
and the wife filed an appeal. The Utah Supreme Court, citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412, held that the order of the district 
11
 Utah R. App. P. 3 (a) . 
12
 Utah R. App. P. 4 (a) . 
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court was a "final appealable order" and took jurisdiction. Id. 
at 648. "The order . . . resolv[ed] an issue of vital 
importance and conclud[ed] a major phase in the process of 
formal testacy proceedings. Failure to allow an appeal from 
such an order could compel all subsequent proceedings, including 
partial distributions, to go forward under a cloud of 
uncertainty that would seriously impair the personal 
representative's efforts to administer the estate." Id. 
Other Utah decisions have similarly recognized that an 
order in a probate "proceeding" is a final order for purposes of 
appeal. For example, in In re Estate of Bacon, 556 P.2d 1271, 
1272 (Utah 1976) the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's refusal to hear late objections relating to the subject 
matter of a probate order as "an attempt to raise and 
re-litigate issues." In In re Estate of Vorhees, 366 P.2d 977, 
98 0 (Utah 1961), the Utah Supreme Court held an order compelling 
a decedent's widow to transfer land to the estate was final 
although the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over 
other estate matters. The court premised its holding on the 
fact that the order decided "the real issue" in the case and 
"did not leave open for reconsideration the question as to who 
owned that property." Id. The court concluded that "there was 
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nothing further to be decided on that particular issue." Id. 
It then heard the appeal. 
Finally, in In re Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997), ordering an opposite result as the one here, the 
trial judge had ordered a distributee to return stock to the 
estate. In holding that order to be final and appealable, this 
Court noted that "Utah has effectively adopted [a] pragmatic, 
case-by-case approach to finality in probate matters." Id. at 
1016. Whether or not the stock would be returned to the estate 
was "an issue of vital importance" and appellate review at that 
stage "remove[d] the 'cloud of uncertainty.'" The Court 
recognized that if the issue were not resolved at that stage on 
appeal, the "case would effectively end because no money would 
be available to pay claims against the estate or administrative 
expenses." Id. This case differs inasmuch as Barbara did not 
appeal the final appealable order in 2003. 
Similarly, Barbara missed the statutory time to apply for 
vacation of the 2 003 order. "A petition13 for vacation . . . 
must be filed prior to the earlier of the following time limits 
. . . [tjwelve months after the entry of the order sought to be 
A "petition" is a "written request to the court for an order 
after notice." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(37). 
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vacated." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412(3)(c). No Petition for 
Vacation was ever filed in this case. 
If, as Barbara asserts, her 2003 Petition qualified as a 
"proceeding" she let the time periods for appeal and vacation of 
that Order lapse. These failures seal the finality provisions 
of Section 412. 
B. If Barbara was required to file a proceeding "Against 
the Distributees'' in order to recover property already 
distributed/ the time to file has long-expired. 
Brooke and Allyson are, and at all times since May, 2003 
have been, distributees of the Estate. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-201(13); Ex.21 The Utah Uniform Probate Code also 
contains procedures to cover proceedings *[a]fter distribution14" 
for claims that have not been barred15. Recovery may be sought 
"from [] distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004." Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-104. Section 1004 seems to apply: "After 
assets of an estate have been distributed and subject to Section 
75-3-1006, an undischarged claim not barred16 may be prosecuted 
in a proceeding against one or more distributees." 
14
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104. 
15
 If the Court agrees with Barbara that her 2003 "Petition" was 
a "formal proceeding" under Chapter 3, the claim is arguably 
"barred" as anticipated in this statute. 
See footnote [15]. 
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Section 1006 states that "unless previously barred by 
adjudication . . . the claim of any claimant to recover from a 
distribute who is liable to pay the claim and the right of any 
heir or devisee or of a successor personal representative acting 
in their behalf, to recover property improperly distributed or 
the value thereof from any distribute is barred at the later of 
. . . (b)(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof." 
Therefore, if this Court finds that Barbara's claim to recover 
distributed property is not "previously barred by adjudication" 
as analyzed in Section 4.A above, her claim is barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-1006(1) (b) (ii) . 
C. Public policy, principles of law and the purposes and 
policies of the Uniform Probate Code favor this 
result. 
To illustrate the correctness of this result, it is helpful 
to consider a few factual realities about this six-year long 
piece of litigation. First, it is significant that the 
distributees, Brooke and Allyson, are residents of Nevada. R.2 
There is no provision in the Utah Uniform Probate Code that a 
Court automatically has jurisdiction over non-resident 
distributees. Arguably, Barbara would have had to succeed in 
her 2 0 03 "proceeding" and then enforce that order under Section 
104. In other words, in this hypothetical, Barbara would have 
had an "undischarged claim not barred" and would have had one 
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year from distribution in which to commence a proceeding against 
the distributees for the return of the property. In order for 
this Court to gain personal jurisdiction17 over them, Brooke and 
Allyson would have had to be sued in Nevada. 
Second, Barbara claims in her brief that the 2003 
distribution to Brooke and Allyson ''rendered the Estate 
insolvent." Brief at p.9. The Estate was initially possessed 
of $75,876.85 in cash, $16,975.41 in stock and $96,600.00 in 
liquidated pre-marital property. R.1005-1008, 1580 This money 
was spent on administration/litigation over a period of five (5) 
years. The Estate was solvent until 2005. If, at any time, 
17
 The trial court obviously has subject matter jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. 75-1-303(4) but, post-distribution, 
personal jurisdiction must be obtained "against the 
distributee." In this case, personal jurisdiction was in Nevada 
and would necessarily have been a separate action. 
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Barbara would have stopped her litigation on the seven (7) 
unsuccessful claims18, money could have been distributed. 
Third, the stated purposes of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
are to "discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property" and to "promote a speedy and 
efficient system for administering the estate of the decedent 
and making distribution to his successors." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-102(2)(b) and (c). A simple reading of the Will and the 
Ante-Nuptial Agreement show that Louis intended to will "all of 
his [premarital] property to his daughters. The Ante-Nuptial 
Agreement defined Barbara's interest in the homestead: life 
Over time Barbara's claims have included: 
(1) that she was a licensee not a life tenant R.52 
(2) a claim to creditor status R.1475 
(3) a claim to a life insurance policy R.220 
(4) a claim to remove the personal representative R.822 
(5) an attempt to freeze the Estate's assets R.825 
(6) a claim to "lost' civil service payments R.680 
(7) claims for a homestead allowance, family allowance and 
elective share R.58 
(8) a claim to health insurance R.221 
(9) a claim for accident insurance R.682 
(10) cost of living increases in the above R.220 
(11) reimbursement for a lost annuity R.221 
(12) an attempt to be appointed successor personal 
representative R.1256 
(13) a claim to the value of stock on the date of death, not on 
the date the stock was sold R.1641 
(14) a claim to gifts Louis gave his daughters during the 
marriage R.1644 
All have been resolved against Barbara on their me^rits and are 
no longer a part of this appeal. 
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tenant. The efficient and relatively informal probate system, 
by which "every proceeding is independent of every other 
proceeding"19 provides the possibility for finality and speedy 
appellate review of final orders. These policies are noted and 
observed in the Christensen, Vorhees and Morrison cases cited 
above. Through Section 1006, the Code sets an "ultimate time 
limit within which creditors, heirs and devisees of a decedent 
may recover from distributees." Uniform Probate Code Practice 
Manual, 2nd Edition, Section 3-1006 Comment, p. 375 (emphasis 
added). Barbara's interest in the homestead was determined long 
ago. 
5. LOUIS' OVERALL INTENT WAS TO BEQUEATH HIS SEPARATE 
PROPERTY TO HIS DAUGHTERS. 
Prior to his marriage to Barbara, Louis took steps to 
protect his separate property "for his heirs." Louis contracted 
with Barbara for his separate property to be separate and, 
reciprocally, for her separate property to be separate. Shortly 
thereafter, in his Will he left "all my property" to his 
children. The only logical conclusion is that he meant "all my 
[separate] property." 
Louis did not disinherit Barbara. He provided for her in 
his Will by stating she would "take per the terms of our 
19
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106(1) (a) 
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antinuptial agreement:" terms negotiated and agreed upon by 
Louis and Barbara themselves. Barbara's distributions under the 
Will are outlined in the Statement of Facts, Paragraph 4 above. 
It is undisputed that the only property "acquired by the 
parties during the marriage" was money/cash. R.1585 It is 
undisputed that the homestead is premarital property. R.1004-
1005 At the time of Louis' death, the Estate was originally 
possessed of $75,876.85 and obtained an additional $96,600 by 
liquidating non-cash assets such as (premarital) real estate and 
water shares. 
It is undisputed that expenses of administration, creditors 
and funeral expenses are paid before any of the legacies in the 
will are paid. Utah Code Arm. § 75-3-805. As established 
above, Barbara's legacy (property "acquired by the parties 
during the marriage") was a general devise chargeable to 
specific property: i.e. the cash acquired by the parties during 
the marriage. 
The cash on hand at death was spent in litigation with 
Barbara who was unsuccessful on all but one (1) of her claims. 
It would be patently violative of Louis' intent to now allow 
Barbara to reach premarital property to recoup the cash she 
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(through four20 (4) lawyers and more than six (6) years of 
litigation) forced the Estate to spend. 
As the trial court found, there is no residual devise in 
Louis' will. R.1754 fn.l The Ante-Nuptial Agreement provided 
that all property ''acquired by the parties during the marriage," 
or marital property, was devised to Barbara. This was a general 
devise chargeable to specific property. See Argument l.B supra. 
The will provided that "all my [separate] Property" was devised 
to Brooke and Allyson, a general devise. The granddaughters 
were granted general pecuniary devises of $5,000 each. 
The Estate collected and spent both marital and 
premarital property on administration (litigation). The 
homestead is not an asset of the Estate subject to 
liquidation because of Barbara's life estate. See Argument 
3. supra. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The Court of Appeals should deny Barbara's various claims 
for relief including the request that the Court of Appeals order 
the beneficiaries to reconvey the property to the Estate. Not 
20
 See various appearances and withdrawals of counsel at R.26 
(McCullough) R.52 (Kanell), R.870 (Hill) and R.903 (Bennett). 
It is submitted that Barbara's theories and strategies have 
changed over time and with her changes in counsel; those changes 
and choices, and not fundamental unfairness in the Will of Louis 
Uzelac or the Utah Uniform Probate Code, have caused the result. 
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only is this request time barred and violative of Louis' obvious 
intent but it is not relief properly ordered directly from the 
appellate level. Furthermore, there is no appellate 
jurisdiction to order this relief in 2007. The personal 
representative's deed of distribution to Barbara, Brooke and 
Allyson was made after an adjudication. A proceeding to recover 
the property was denied in 2 003 and that order became final 3 0 
days after its entry. 
The Court of Appeals should uphold the trial court's 
rulings on remand with one exception. The value of the POD 
accounts should not have been included in the calculation of 
marital property Louis "held at death." The case should be 
remanded and Judgment should enter in favor of Barbara and 
against the Estate in the amount of $18,962.92. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007. 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
largaretH.Olson,Esq. 
Of Counsel 
Counsel for Interveners/ 
Cross Appellants Susan Brooke 
Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing (Amended) Brief of Intervenors/Cross Appellants were 
hand delivered to the following: 
Charles M. Bennett 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
257 West 200 South, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2142 
with a courtesy copy to: 
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr. 
535 West Sweetwater Avenue 
Phoenix, AZ 85 029 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007. 
'JAAJ 'ttCk-^ 
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ADDENDUM 
Notice of Cross Appeal, dated September 19, 2006 
Personal Representative's Deed of Distribution, 
dated May 29, 2003 
Motion for an Order Directing Beneficiaries to 
Return Estate Property to the Estate, or in the 
Alternative Voiding the Deed of Distribution, dated 
July 25, 2003 
Final Order denying Motion for an Order Directing 
Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the 
Estate, or in the Alternative Voiding the Deed of 
Distribution, dated September 29, 2003 
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PERSONAL REPRESENT* FIVE'S DEED OF DISTRIBUTION 
THIS DEED is made by Joseph G. Uzelac, as personal representative of'The 'Estate of Louis J. Uzelac, 
deceased ("Grantor"), to Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac, whose address is 4200 East Lodewyck 
Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89121, subject to a life estate determinable in Barbara Uzelac, whose address is 5561 South 
Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
WHEREAS Grantor is the qualified personal representative of said estate, filed as Probate Number Probate 
No. 993901690 in Salt Lake County, Utah; and 
WHEREAS pursuant to the Order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
(Judge L.A. Dever) dated December 18,2001 and attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "Order"), Barbara Uzelac 
has a life estate determinable in such real estate as set forth in that certain Antenuptial Agreement dated March 25, 
1976 between the deceased and Barbara Bowden [Uzelac], and as the life tenant, is responsible for payment of all 
taxes, maintenance costs, and the cost of insuring such real estate against loss since November 6, 1999 until the 
termination of her tenancy; and 
WHEREAS Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac are entitled to distribution of the hereinafter 
described real property, subject to the life estate determinable in Barbara 1 Izelac as set forth in the Order; 
rHEREFORE pursuant to the Order, Grantor hereby conveys and releases to Susan Brooke Mageras and 
Allyson D. Uzelac, subject to the right of Barbara Uzelac to reside in the dwelling house located on such property 
for her lifetime, or such shorter time as she may elect, and provided that in the event that Barbara Uzelac should 
remarry, she shall move therefrom within a reasonable time back to her own separate property, the following 
described real property in located Salt Lake County, Utah: 
TAX' ID NO 22-15-103-006-0000 
COM 1504.7 Ft N ft W ^  Cor of Sec 15 1 2S R IE, SI ! I • il! 1" 8 1 20 ' V 203.8 
Ft to Cen of Highland Drive, N 0°42' '.V 74 Ft E 5 39.8. !• V"; G Z " « 0S.\ ft \i 
87°20,W 293 Ft to Beg. 
TAX ID NO. 22-15-103-005-000 
COM 1504.7 ft. N & N 87°20i W 203.8 Ft & N 0°42* W 74 Ft fr W % Cor Sec 
15 T 2S, R 1E, SL Mer» N 0°42# W 150 Ft E 531 06 Ft S 8° W 151 7 Ft W 
509.84 Ft to Beg. 
with all appuilend 11cr/ 
EXECUTED tins T^day 01 May, JWJ, 
.
 CouRTESY RECORDING 
"1 h'is document ts being recorded solely as a courtesy 
and an accommodation to the parties named herein. 
Associated Title Company hereby e*pressty disclaims 
any responsibility or liability fot the accuracy or the 
fontr***1 f * * r *o l 
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Uzelac, (fersonal Representative 
ot*Thi Estate of Louis J. Uzelac, deceased. 
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no 
en 
1 I 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
)ss. 
) 
On the 25\ day of May, 2003, personally appeared before me Joseph G. Uzelac, the signer of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
ZLLLJLM*. 
Notary Public 
G:\uze2021tV2aEsute\PR Deed (LE Paicds).wpd 2 
EXHlbi 
Jack M. Morgan, Jr. (Bar No. 6941) 
Mary C. Gordon {Bar No. 6880) 
MANMNG CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR LLC 
Third Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 
Telephone: (801) 363 n ^ 
Attorneys for the Estate o- _ . >. . _ 
hi 
• -
:
 £«-£-. 
ni.'^jii£T;/7. :ou. tu 
ucu j g
 t'0iji 
fp£^^tttohi,ul, 
r j ib THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ES \.K, 
LOUIS J. UZELAC, 
Deceased. 
ORDER ON ESTATE'S MO J •« >IM 
FOR ASSISTANCE IN 
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATL 
TDtau No 993901690 
Judge L. A 
On July 12, 2001, the >- ,M;f <•> M,I. . <, n. •~<«:ite"» fiiH a Motion for Assistance m 
luistrauun oi csmie. 
•.in for (I) Homestead 
Gordon ant! Ja K M Morean 
on behalf c -u....- > 
of Louis J. Uzelac, filed 
owance; and H) Elective Share of Barbara 
„iiu on November 6, 20(11. Mary C. 
„*...»..
 Wl the Estate; Theodore E. Kanell appeared 
ison appeared on behalf of Susan Brooke Mageras 
and Allyson D. Uzelac, chnun-u vi mc ucicucm and beneficiaries under his will. 
Based upon th- pleadings and affidavits on file in this matter he memm anda o«" <h-
parties, ihh m>:> 
GO 
an 
ro 
<7> 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been no challenge to the validity of the Ante Nuptial Agreement dated 
March 25, 1976, by and between Louis J. Uzelac and Barbara Bowden [Uzelac] ("Ante Nuptial 
Agreement,,), and the Court finds no basis for any such challenge. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes as a matter of law that the Ante Nuptial Agreement is a valid and binding contract, 
subject to ordinary contract principles. In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343,1346 (Utah 1994). 
2. It is undisputed by the parties that at the time of the marriage, Louis Uzelac's 
assets included three parcels of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, identified as 
follows: 
COM 1504.7 Ft N fr W 1/4 Cor of Sec 15 T 2S, 
R IE, SL Mer, N 87°20f W 203.8 Ft to Cen of 
Highland Drive, N 0°42' W 74 Ft E 509.84 Ft 
S 8°W 98.1 Ft N 97°20f W 293 Ft to Beg. 
1 Ac. 
(Book 3485 Page 498) 
COM 1504.7 ft. N & N 87°20' W 203.8 Ft & N 
0°4T W 74 Ft fr W 1/4 Cor Sec 15 T 2S, R 
1E, SL Mer, N 0^2* W 150 Ft E 531.06 Ft 
S 8° W 151.7 Ft W 509.84 Ft to Beg 2 Ac. 
(Book 3485, Page 499) 
Lot # 1 of Cottonwood Glade Sub Division according 
to the official plat thereof. 
(Book 3486, Page 420). 
3. The Ante Nuptial Agreement provides that Ms. Uzelac "shall have, in the event of 
the death of Louis, the right to reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her lifetime, or such 
G:\u2c202 II\20 Estate^RDERMotionforAssistancc.wpd 2 
shorter t ime as she in.i > -Hr - l I I 1 L "v •• - '• Jw Jk .nU remarry , she shall moi 'e 
therefrom within a reasonable t ime back, to her o w n separate property." Ante Nupt ia l Agreemen t 
1 "l> I In ii HI hull \ ii 11 iihi nil I in Iiiii IIILI language creates in, N Is Uzelac a life estate 
determinable in the dwelling house of Louis and Barbara Uzelac and the f 
property idenlilied above, upon which the dwelling home is located (" 
The language of the Ante Nuptial Agreement dn -. 
Uzelac in the third oai eel of real property identified above. 
,ID J. Uzelac died on November 6 I •) W Mim n1 m ii i iiiiii , i I. mi 11 ciac lias 
occupied the :~tate Property ar, ll l ' As the life tenant, she is responsible fbi the 
m a i n t e n a n c e u i u nnerrv M\\\ IUII'IIH'III ill ill il IM" . iiiiiiiiiiliilllll hri iili in in \ iniiniKilci Sheppickv. 
Sheppick, 138 P. i 169, 1170 (Utah 1914), 
b. Ilfic Fvif/ifc' mil jCiMiiHinr,!";,;!:!" ,!" ,M II1,!1 nmiinfnu.i I" l!l.!.sf | /rnperty and p a y m e n t o f all 
fjpcf- oiii the fli I lil rl I t inl .iliove so long as the real proper ty is held by the 
I 1 " I", 
" i zd upon the foregoing Conclus ions of Law, the Court hereby enters the fo l lowing 
1 Barbara Uzelac, as the life tenant, is responsible for payment of all taxes , 
piiiiMHiH ni»i., m I iiil in nl i u mi1", ui r I ill b s l a l e I ' topei ty aga ins t loss s i n c e N o v e m b e r 
6 , 1 9 9 9 until the termination of her tenancy. 
2 Uaibai.i U'zdac shall immeilidl Iv fciiiibuise l(lllt,ll I "j.ilc lb.ra.ll faxes paid by the 
Estate on the Life Estate Property since November v l Q99 ^ 
*v'ween the Estate and Ms. Uzelac. 
CAnelOlf TOO Esiatt\OR.OERMKioiifofAiiiMiwt.twrf ~ ' 3 
3. Barbara Uzelac shall immediately reimburse the Estate for all maintenance costs 
incurred by the Estate to maintain the Life Estate Property since November 6, 1999. 
4. Barbara Uzelac shall immediately reimburse the Estate for all costs incurred by 
the Estate to insure the Life Estate Property since November 6,1999. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this Y \ dav of December, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
&BEDNARLLC 
Mary OLyordon, Esq. 
Attorneys for the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac 
PLANT WALLACE CHR1STENSEN & KANELL 
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq. 
Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac 
as 
co 
G.Wie202lSV20 E**c\OfcDERMoiio«forAwsu*KeA*t>d 
2? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON 
ESTATE'S MOTION FOR ASSISTANCE IN ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE to t it 
by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, this \'A day of December, 2001, to the following: 
Margaret Olson, Esq. 
HOBBSADONDAKIS& OLSON 
341 South Main Street, #208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for AUyson Uzclac & Brooke Mageras 
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq. 
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111 
Attorneys for Barbara Uzeiac 
• i 
Q 
a 
GAuze20ZlS\2(> kUMeVLJH III IIII I mi mini J CT 
I,ll. 
BLACKBURN & a i 
CHARLES M. BENN 
77 W. 200 So. St., Suite 400 
O - U I t 
Attorneys tor B M*BARA BOWDKN IUVA A« ' 
1AJLD1S 
3 
no 
o co o ; 
CV 
r COURT OF SALT L AK*. i XH 
STATE OF UTAH 
4; 4* 4- «*• -i-
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF: 
LOUIS I. II/.EI.AI 
JAKBARA UZELAC'S MOTION 
FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING 
BENEFICIARIES TO RETURN 
ESTATE PROPERTY TO THE 
ESTATE, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE VOIDING THE 
DEED OF DISTRIBUTION 
.19111690 
Barbara Uzelac, through her counsel of record, moves the Court for an Order ret:-!- i 
• • • . -n distributed property to the estate by executing the deed attacned 
as Exhibit '• in :n ilternative, Barbara moves the Court for an Order voiding rh 
ara further has a claim for attorney fees and costs; however, 
she is asking the Court to reserve that issue until the trial of this matter 
rasis of this motion is that the personal representative breached his duty by making this 
uu'-
w
 md there will be no prejudice to the beneficial ; * motion. 
..i^ a tlita^vday ot July, 2003. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Bennett, Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac 
H:\CMB\PLEADINGS ETaUZELAC-MOTION-RETURN-PROP.MOT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BARBARA 
UZELAC'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING BENEFICIARIES TO RETURN 
ESTATE PROPERTY TO THE ESTATE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE VOIDING THE 
DEED OF DISTRIBUTION was mailed to the following person this :%f~day of July, 2003: 
Margaret H. Olson 
Hobbs & Olson 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mary Gordon 
Lee Curtis 
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bender 
3rd Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Angela Marie Mageras 
4200 East Lodewyck Drive 
Las Vegas, NV 89121 
Amanda D. Mageras 
4200 East Lodewyck Drive 
Las Vegas, NV 89121 
H:\CMB\PLEADINGS ETOUZELAC-MOTION-RETURN-PROP.MOT 
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EXHIBIT A 
When recorded, mail to: Mail tax notice to: 
Charles M. Bennett Barbara Uzelac 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 5561 Highland Dr. 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
Grantors, pursuant to the Order of the Court on , 2003, in the Matter of the 
Estate of Louis J. Uzelac, State of Utah, Third District Court, Probate No. 993901690, and in 
order to reverse the Personal Representative Deed dated May 29,2003 and recorded on June 4, 
2003 in Book 8811 Page 2614 Entry No. 8675566, hereby quit claim, transfer, and convey, 
without warranty, to Joseph Uzelac, Personal Representative of the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac, 
grantee, the following described real property in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
1. COM 1504.7 Ft N fr W 1/4 Cor of Sec 15 T 2S, R IE, SL Mer N 87° 20' W 203.8 
Ft to Cen of Highland Drive, N 0° 42' W 74 Ft E 509.84 Ft S 8°W 98.1 Ft N 
87°20' W 293 Ft to Beg. 
The tax identification number for this property is 22-15-103-006-0000. 
2. COM 1504.7 Ft N & N 87° 20' W 203.8 Ft & N 0° 42' W 74 Ft fr W 1/4 Cor Sec 
15 T 2S, R IE, SL Mer, N 0° 42' W 150 Ft E 531.06 Ft S 8° W 151.7 Ft W 509.84 
Ft to Beg. 
The tax identification number for this property is 22-15-103-005-0000. 
Each grantor warrants that she has taken no action to transfer or encumber the described 
property. 
Page 1 
DATED this day of July, 2003. 
Barbara Uzelac 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing inatrumeirt was ackiiuwled^ed belbie llltf tills day ot July, 2UU3, by 
Barbara Uzelac, who being first duly sworn, stated that she executed the foregoing quit claim 
deed and that the facts recited therein are true and correct. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
DATED this day of July, 2003. 
Susan Brooke Mageras 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of July, 2003, by 
Susan Brooke Mageras, who being first duly sworn, stated that she executed the foregoing quit 
claim deed and that the facts recited therein are true and correct. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
Page 2 
DATED this day of July, 2003. 
Allyson D. Uzelac 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of July, 2003, by 
Allyson D. Uzelac, who being first duly sworn, stated that she executed the foregoing quit claim 
deed and that the facts recited therein are true and correct. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
H:\CMB\CONTRACTS\UZEIAC-QUIT-CLAIM-DEED.QCD 
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BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283) 
77 W. 200 So. St., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-7900 
Attorneys for BARBARA BOWDEN UZELAC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) BARBARA UZELAC'S 
OF: ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF HER MOTION FOR AN 
LOUIS J. UZELAC ) ORDER DIRECTING 
) BENEFICIARIES TO RETURN 
Deceased. ) ESTATE PROPERTY TO THE 
) ESTATE, OR IN THE 
) ALTERNATIVE VOIDING THE 
) DEED OF DISTRIBUTION 
) Probate No. 993901690 
) Judge Dever 
* * * * * 4c * 
Barbara Uzelac, through her counsel of record, files this Memorandum in support of her 
Motion for an Order requiring the beneficiaries of the estate to return distributed property to the 
estate by executing the deed attached to her Motion as Exhibit A, or in the alternative, for an Order 
voiding the personal representative's May 31,2003 deed (attached hereto as Exhibit C). 
FACTS 
1. Barbara Uzelac has a claim against the estate based on her ante-nuptial agreement 
with her husband Louis (the "Contract"). See Exhibit A. 
Tftasasr 
^ 2 8 2003 
KECOUNTV 
2. Barbara claims that the personal representative has breached the terms of the 
Contract by failing to distribute to her all property "acquired by the parties" during their marriage. 
3. The personal representative's defense to Barbara's claim is based on an 
interpretation of the Contract that "acquired by the parties" should mean "acquired by the parties" 
together or jointly or, if acquired separately, commingled with the other party's property. 
4. Barbara's claim is based on interpreting the Contract to mean "acquired by the 
parties" in any way an acquisition can be made, whether jointly, separately, or otherwise, and 
without regard to how the property was held by the parties after the acquisition. 
5. Louis prepared a list of his bank accounts on February 1, 1976. See Exhibit B. The 
total of his accounts as of that date equaled $51,497.45, 
6. Using Exhibit B as a starting point, Barbara has calculated the value of Louis' bank 
accounts on April 14,1976, the date of the marriage, as follows: 
{Date 
| 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
| 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
| 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
Financial Institution 
Walker Bank & Trust 
Walker Bank & Trust 
Walker Bank & Trust 
Zions Bank 
Zions Bank 
Zions Bank 
Associated Federal Employees 
Federal Credit Union 
Tracy 
Walker Bank & Trust 
Balance 
$ 2,000.00 
$ 2,000.00 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 2,000.00 
$ 2,000.00 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 6,985.53 
$ 10,830.36 
$ 9,296.12 
Interest 
$ 20.00 
$ 20.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 20.00 
$ 20.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 69.86 
$ 108.30 
$ 92.96 
4/14/76 | 
| $ 2,020.00 
$ 2,020.00 
$ 1,010.00 
$ 2,020.00 ] 
$ 2,020.001 
$ 1,010.00| 
$ 7,055.391 
$ 10,938.661 
$ 9,389.081 
- 2 -
Date 
| 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
1 2/1/76 
Financial Institution 
Prudential 
First Security Bank 
Credit Union 
Balance 
$ 7,172.57 
$ 4,212.87 
$ 3,000.00 
$ 51,497.45 
Interest 
$ 71.73 
$ 42.13 
$ 30.00 
$514.98 
4/14/76 ] 
$ 7,244.301 
$ 4,255.001 
$ 3,030.001 
$ 52,012.43 | 
7. Based on the Affidavit of Joseph Uzelac, Louis owned the following accounts at his 
death with the values listed at his date of death: 
Financial Institution 
Associated Federal Credit Union, No. 18597 
1 First Security Bank, No. 070551007602 
1 First Security Bank, No. 070551007603 
1 First Security Bank, No. 067-10751-33 
| Beehive Credit Union, No. 105049 
1 Bank One, No. 7778-6136 
US Bank, No. 1-531-0024-5551 
US Bank, No. 3-531-0007-2308 
TOTAL 
Value at Date of Death 
$ 68,669.15 
$ 12,744.71 
$ 68,575.071 
$ 6,403.31 1 
$ 31,316.82 | 
$ 16,559.641 
$ 36,183.08 | 
$ 21,544.75 | 
$ 261,996.53J 
Although the personal representative represented that these values are date of death values, in 
several cases that is not correct. However, for purposes of this motion, the errors make no 
difference to the issue before the Court. 
8. As explained below, Barbara calculates her entitlements under the Contract to be at 
least $189,894. 
- 3 -
9. On May 31,2003, the personal representative distributed the remaining 3+ acres of 
real property on Highland Drive owned by the estate (the "Highland Drive Property") to Susan 
Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac subject to a life estate in Barbara Uzelac. See Exhibit C. 
10. On May 31, 2003, the personal representative sold the vacant lot on Pheasant Circle 
and all remaining water shares to the Goff Trust (the "Pheasant Circle Property") for $84,600.00 for 
the land and $12,000 for the water shares. 
11. On December 6,2001, DCH Holdings made an offer to purchase the Highland Drive 
property plus the lot on Pheasant Circle for $ 1,100,000.00. See Exhibit D. 
12. While Barbara does not know the exact value of the assets remaining in the estate, it 
is no more than the $96,600.00 that could have been received on the sale of the Pheasant Circle 
property plus a claim for some of the tangible personal property in Barbara's possession. 
13. The Personal Representative represented to Barbara's former counsel, John Hill, that 
the reason for the sale of the Pheasant Circle lot was to raise money to pay administrative expenses. 
Calculation of Damages 
Although a strict reading of the Contract could lead one to conclude that the surviving 
spouse would be entitled to everything acquired during the marriage without any reductions, 
Barbara believes this interpretation would be unreasonable. Barbara believes that all property 
"acquired by the parties" should be interpreted to mean all acquisitions by Louis and herself less the 
living expenses that they paid with those acquisitions. That is a reasonable interpretation of what 
the Contract means when it refers to all property "acquired by the parties." 
-4 -
Based on this interpretation, Barbara has will calculate at trial her entitlements under the 
Contract by taking Louis' assets at the time of his death and subtracting therefiom his assets at the 
time of Louis's and her marriage. She notes that this amount would need to be adjusted if any of 
the acquisitions during the marriage came within the provisions of Paragraph 9 of the Contract. 
That paragraph treats the sales proceeds and any exchanged property from any property owned by 
either party at the time of the marriage as pre-marital property and not "as property acquired during 
the marriage." For purposes of this motion and in order to avoid issues regarding the application of 
paragraph 9 to stocks and real estate, Barbara has calculated her minimum entitlement based on the 
value of Louis' bank accounts upon the marriage and the value of his bank accounts at the time of 
his death. Thus, Barbara calculates this portion of her damages as follows: 
Value of assets on February 1,1976 $51,497.45 
Value of assets on April 14, 1976 (date of marriage) $52,012.43 
Value of assets on Louis' date of death $261,996.53 
Thus, at a minimum, if Barbara's interpretation of the Contract is accurate, she has a claim of 
$209,984.10. While the personal representative has claims against Barbara for various items and 
although Barbara requested that the Personal Representative provide an updated itemization, those 
claims apparently do not exceed $20,000. Accordingly, the personal representative has not kept 
sufficient assets in the estate to satisfy Barbara's claim ($189,984.10). Although not necessary for 
this motion, Barbara notes that she is entitled to other properties that Louis acquired during the 
marriage and that were not used by Louis or herself for living expenses. 
- 5 -
ARGUMENT 
Under Section 75-3-101, a testator has the power to leave property by will, but that power is 
subject to the "restrictions and limitations" contained in the Utah Uniform Probate Code. U.C.A. 
§75-3-101. In addition, while real and personal property devolve to the devisees upon the 
decedent's death, that devolution is "subject to administration." Thus, under Section 75-3-901, 
successors (including devisees) take ownership of property "subject to all charges incident to 
administration, including the claims of creditors " U.C.A. §75-3-901. Because creditors are 
paid first under Section 75-3-901, Section 75-3-902 describes the order in which estate property 
abates in order to pay creditors claims (and other claims set forth in Section 75-3-901): first, 
property not devised by will, second, residuary devises, third general devises, and fourth specific 
devises. U.C.A. §75-3-902. 
The personal representative has a duty to "administer and distribute the estate in accordance 
with the rights of claimants." UCA §75-3-703. When the personal representative distributed the 
Highland Drive property to the remainder beneficiaries, he breached that duty. To remedy this 
breach, Barbara asks the Court to order the beneficiaries to deed the property back to the personal 
representative. 
The Court should note that there is no prejudice to the remainder beneficiaries. Their 
interest is a future interest that is postponed until Barbara's death. On the other hand, the potential 
prejudice to Barbara is significant. Any voluntary or involuntary act by the remainder beneficiaries 
could prevent Barbara from being able to reach this property to satisfy her claim and would, in any 
event, significantly complicate Barbara's ability to reach this property. For example if either 
- 6 -
remainder beneficiary was subject to a bankruptcy proceeding, Barbara would need to intervene in 
that bankruptcy to protect her rights against the Highland Drive property. Further, if a remainder 
beneficiary were to die, or become disabled, Barbara would have to pursue a claim against that 
beneficiary's legal representative. Since both remainder beneficiaries are residents of Nevada, any 
legal representative is unlikely to be subject to the jurisdiction of a Utah court. 
The Court has plenary power to enter the requested Order to protect Barbara's interests. 
U.C.A. §75-1-302(2) (the Court has "full power to administer justice in the maitters that come 
before it"). Since the remainder beneficiaries have notice of this motion, and since they could have 
taken some action to transfer or encumber legal or equitable title to their remainder interests in the 
Highland Drive property, Barbara has included in the proposed deed a warranty that none of the 
parties has taken any action to transfer or encumber the property. 
While Barbara suggests resolving this matter by an Order requiring the beneficiaries to 
execute the deed attached to the Motion as Exhibit A, there is another way that the Court can 
protect her interest. Under Section 75-3-712, upon petition of an interested person, the Court will 
void any transaction by the personal representative that is affected by a "substantial conflict of 
interest." U.C.A. §75-3-712(1). If there is a substantial conflict of interest, the only exceptions that 
allow a court not to void the transaction are either a court order authorizing the transaction in the 
first instance or the interested person's informed consent. Neither of these exceptions are 
applicable. Since there is no legitimate basis for this distribution other than to harm Barbara's 
interests and enhance those of the remainder beneficiaries, the Court can find that the personal 
representative's action was based on a desire to benefit his nieces at the expense of Louis' surviving 
- 7 -
wife and that this constitutes a substantial conflict of interest. It also constitutes a violation of the 
personal representative's duty of impartiality. C.f. U.C.A. §75-7-302(9) ("[T]he trustee shall act 
impartially in investing and managing the trust assets ") 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Barbara is entitled to her attorney fees and costs in rectifying this breach of trust. Hughes v. 
Cajferty, 46 P.3d 233,445 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2002 UT App 105,122-24 (Utah App. 2002) (re 
beneficiary's entitlement to fees for breach of duty by the trustee); Rohan v. Boseman, 6 P.3d 753 
(Utah App. 2002), ^ f 13 (awarding bad faith attorney fees based on the "inherent power" of the court 
to do justice and equity in the matters that come before it). However, since Barbara is likely to have 
an additional claim to attorney fees and costs as a result of other actions by the personal 
representative, Barbara asks that the Court reserve this issue and reconsider this matter in light of 
all the facts and circumstances during or after the trial scheduled for October 7,2003. 
CONCLUSION 
Barbara asks the Court to order the beneficiaries to execute Exhibit A to her motion. In the 
alternative, Barbara asks that the Court void the May 31, 2003 Deed (Exhibit C to this 
memorandum). Further, Barbara asks the Court to reserve the issue of whether or not Barbara is 
entitled to her attorney fees and costs regarding this matter until trial. 
Dated this^day of July, 2003. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Bennett; Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
LOUIS J. UZELAC, 
Deceased. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 993901690 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
This matter is currently before this Court on Barbara Uzelac's "Motion For An 
Order Directing Beneficiaries To Return Estate Property To The Estate Or In The 
Alternative Voiding The Deed Of Distribution." The relevant facts are as follows. 
On May 31, 2003 the personal representative of decedent's estate distributed, 
the remaining acres of the Highland Drive Property to his daughters, Susan Mageras 
and Allyson Uzelac ("daughters"), subject to a life estate in his widow Barbara Uzelac 
("Uzelac"). Uzelac's pending motion challenges the representative's distribution 
claiming that it harms her rights as a creditor by reducing the estate assets to less than 
the amount of her claim against the estate. As a result, Uzelac requests that the Court 
either: 1)order decedent's daughters to deed the property back pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-703; or 2) void the deed as a "substantial conflict of interest" pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712(1). 
As an initial matter, issues pertaining to an interpretation of the Ante Nuptial 
In The Matter Of The Estate Page 2 
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Agreement and to Uzelac's "damages theory" are the proper subject of the October 
7, 2003, trial or have been previously addressed in the Court's Order on the Estate's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. That said, the sole issue currently before this Court is 
whether a basis exists for the Court to order decedent's daughters to return the 
distributed property. Upon thorough consideration of the matter, the Court finds no 
basis for Uzelac's request, and therefore denies Uzelac's motion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-107, entitled "rights of creditors," provides a mechanism 
for creditors to demand that a personal representative take possession of POD 
accounts if the amount of the creditor's claim is greater than the estate assets. The 
provision is limited, however, to creditors who file a "written demand" with the personal 
representative within " two years of the death of decedent." Significantly, Uzelac failed 
to make demand upon the personal representative within the two year time limitation. 
Consequently, Uzelac is unable to rely upon the code provision designed to assist her 
in her claims as a creditor. 
While Uzelac does not rely upon the creditors provision, she does rely upon Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-703 and claims that the personal representative breached his duty to 
administer the estate in accordance with the rights of the claimants. In relevant part, 
UCA § 75-3-703 states "[a] personal representative is under a duty to settle and 
distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and 
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effective will and this code as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best 
interest of the estate." Decedent's will grants his daughters all property in the estate 
except for Uzelac's entitlements under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. See, Uzelac Will at 
1. Under the terms of the Ante Nuptial Agreement Uzelac is granted the right to live in 
the residence located on the estate property for her life or until such time as she moves. 
See, Ante Nuptial Agreement ^ 3. Thus, the personal representative distributed the 
property consistent with the terms of both the will and the agreement, and has not 
breached his duty in violation of UCA § 75-3-703. 
Additionally, Uzelac argues that the Court should void the distribution pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712, by alleging that the transaction was affected by a 
substantial conflict of interest. Under that provision, however, a distribution is voidable 
only if there was a substantial conflict and the decedent's will did not expressly 
authorize the transaction. The Court does not find evidence of a conflict of interest, 
however, even if one did exist, both decedent's will and the agreement expressly 
authorized the transaction. Accordingly, the transaction is not voidable for a conflict of 
interest. 
For the above mentioned reasons, the personal representative has not breached 
his duties and the distribution is not voidable by the Court for a conflict of interest. 
Uzelac's motion is denied. 
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Dated this «rt . day of September, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
LA. DEVL,x * ,„,u 
DISTRICT COUl 
| 0 ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, to the 
following, thisgft. Day of <vWV. 2003: 
Charles M Bennet 
Blackburn & Stoll 
77 West 200 South Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
LR Curtis 
Marcy C Gordon 
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar 
Third Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Margaret Olson 
Hobbs & Olson 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Angela Marie Mageras & Amanda D Mageras 
4200 East Lodewyck Drive 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89121 
